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Introduction
Our task, reflected in this report, was to assess the government’s role in achieving longterm, safe recovery of the Gulf coast communities from the catastrophic disaster of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in the early fall of 2005. The focus is on its catastrophic
nature and the ability of our society to deal with such. This report offers our analysis with
a focus on the federal government, per the national policy interests of the Ford
Foundation. A companion book from the research is under preparation; it will consider
the same question with the state and local government focus added to the federal
response.
Given this first assignment, one would expect that we would carefully consider how much
of a role the federal government should play. However, we were surprised by how strong
each of the subgroups of researchers concluded it should be, independent of the
conclusions of the others. Our surprise was due to the fact that each one of us believes in
and is committed to supporting the important role of local, engaged citizens and the
governments who represent them in achieving disaster resiliency and safe recovery when
disasters do occur. Capacity should be built at the local and state level. We concur with
FEMA Director Fugate who stated in a June 2010 speech: “FEMA is only one part of the
nation’s emergency management team. It’s at the state, tribal and local level that some of
the most important work in preparedness and response happens.”
In the recovery from Hurricane Katrina so many problems occurred, opportunities were
missed, and suffering enhanced many times fold because of the lack of an organized,
systematic response that we think we have no choice but to recommend the achievement
of a more comprehensive strategic federal framework joining together all government
levels in order for there to be hope of achieving successful catastrophic recovery. Each sub
study group – Public Assistance, Individual Assistance, and Mitigation -- came to the
same conclusion independently: A stronger federal role is needed for recovery from a
catastrophe because catastrophes are different from ‘regular’ disasters -- they happen too
infrequently for any state and its local governments to have regular experiences with
them and thus to be able to develop an appropriate well-developed response; and
catastrophes create havoc that incapacitates state/local organizational response and
recovery that is in place in advance of the event.
You will not see in these recommendations broad encouragement to “send more money”
although some of our practitioner advisors remind us that in some of the potential
impacts of our recommendations, we have. Our recommendations are for the federal
system to make more of a commitment to have the necessary organizational goals and
implementation practices including a well-prepared staff (from whatever source they
come) to support the state and local response. In order for any state in the country and
the residents who are in the catastrophe “footprint” to make it through the experience
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and to recover well and more safely, the federal government cannot absolve itself from an
important collaborative role and be “keeper of the knowledge” of how to implement a
recovery from catastrophe.
Additionally, the recovery from future catastrophes in the United States must be
accomplished in a more compassionate manner: namely in a more rapid, more efficient
and a more successful way. That is compassion in our terms. The spirit of the Stafford Act
and the federal system is for the recovery to be managed by the lowest level of
government possible. In the case of a catastrophe, we argue that the federal government
cannot wait to see how much the state and local governments are able to do and then to
fill in what is remaining. The delay is much too harmful and so lacks the spirit and reality
of compassion. Assume there will be a need for significant federal involvement, prepare
for it and put the implementation into effect immediately when such an event occurs.
Preparation for the worst case can be scaled down. We unanimously believe, and our
position is supported by the work of others, that the reverse, scaling up, is extremely
difficult to achieve. The federal government cannot be distant from the recovery; it must
take an active, effective supportive role in every phase, beyond what occurred in Katrina.
As these introductory comments are being refined to meet a June 30, 2010 Ford
Foundation deadline for the final report, we are eight weeks into the BP Deepwater
Horizon oil leak catastrophe. Unfortunately, all evidence from the media and our own
observations of what is transpiring indicate that we would come to the same conclusion if
we were evaluating the federal response to BP leak: The federal response is stunningly
inadequate. Similarly, we can only assume that the long-term recovery will follow the
same unfortunate path as did that of the Katrina/Rita event. Given that both catastrophes
have occurred over the very same Gulf coast footprint in which most of the research team
dwell, we anticipate five years from now we will be compelled to revisit our conclusions
during a second case analysis similar to this one.
The remaining recommendations of this report are wide ranging. We present them
grouped in three themes per the Stafford Act organization: Public Assistance, Human
Recovery (Individual Assistance) and Mitigation. Prior to these sections you will read
sections discussing: issues about catastrophic annexes and triggers, the policy framework
in which we couched our research and our research methods. Separate companion
documents expand the three themes – Public Assistance (PA), Individual Assistance (IA),
and Mitigation. We also refer you to a fourth companion report done in conjunction with
this study which considers the contribution that the Systems Engineering Approach can
make towards broad reform. We need the reform; unfortunately right now only closed
aspects of production seem to be able to take full advantage of the systems approach. We
offer the report to you to consider how the logic of it might be useful. Finally, you will
notice differences in the organization of the sub reports from the format of the sections of
this report. We refined the draft of this primary document after the response to our work
during our presentation on Capitol Hill in April, 2010.
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Catastrophic Annex or Triggers or “Major” Disasters?
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita introduced us to a new level of disaster within the United
States, one which observers are now labeling a “catastrophe.” Given that the focus of this
research is the long-term recovery from a catastrophe, we would like to offer some
thoughts about the use of the term and its linkage to different policy and implementation
options when a major disaster occurs. The Post Katrina Emergency Management
Reform Act (PKEMRA) defines catastrophes in terms of “extraordinary levels of
casualties or damage or disruption severely affecting the population (including
mass evacuations), infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, or
government functions in an area.”
Such disasters are different from lesser incidents, not only because of the scope of damage
and the amount of aid required, but also because the need for swift, decisive, and
successful action extends well beyond the initial response into the recovery phase,
including long-term recovery. We have observed that recognition of those needs – swift,
decisive, successful action -- was absent from a true appreciation of an appropriate
response to the catastrophe surrounding Hurricanes Katrina/Rita. The reason is not only
that a great many people are suffering but that delay may jeopardize recovery, itself.
Bureaucratic norms with an emphasis on procedural conformity, as are dictated for less
severe disasters, do not serve us well after a catastrophe. We do need special rules to
speed the flow of assistance. One national official who testified during the May 12, 2010
hearings held by the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery, Sheila Crowley,
President of the National Low Income Housing Coalition, advocated for a clearer
definition of a catastrophic disaster that will “direct the President to intervene swiftly and
comprehensively in such a case.” She continued: “States vary considerably in their
capacity . . . .to respond to [catastrophic] emergencies. . . .” (pp. 1-2).
To address the challenge of catastrophes, many authorities have called for a
fundamentally different approach to them, a catastrophic annex that would change the
rules for federal assistance (Blakely 2007, Merritt 2007, McCarthy 2009, Moss 2009,
Rainwater 2009). We agree, in part, but the biggest changes have to come before a
catastrophic incident – in the way we prepare for all disasters because we cannot know
how big the next one will be. Essentially, we must build capacity for catastrophes and
then use it as needed depending upon the level of disaster. This is the concept of a
scalable response. It is always possible to scale up quickly beyond the capacity that has
already been built. The emphasis must be on preparation, and the target for preparation
must now be a disaster of the Katrina/Rita magnitude.
Because recovery programs are intergovernmental, preparation must be intergovernmental, but roles will vary depending upon the type of preparation. Planning must take
place at the community level – with varying degrees of support from other levels of
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government. On the other hand, the federal government has to lead in preparation to
manage recovery programs after a disaster. State and local governments may be
overwhelmed and unable to act effectively. In addition it is not cost-effective to maintain
adequate capacity, especially in human resources, in each state and community.
Catastrophes are rare events, and most jurisdictions will never experience one. The
federal government gains experience from all disasters in the country and can move
assets where they are most needed. Thus, for example, FEMA needs a surge force capable
of assisting applicants with a large number of project worksheets all at the same time.
Here we return to the issue of a catastrophic annex. We do not favor a complete new set
of procedures that will disrupt administration and may leave unanticipated gaps. We fear
that an annex will appear to be a panacea and divert attention from the preparation that
is needed. Rather, we will propose in our discussions of individual programs selective
measures to push funds proactively into affected areas and hasten decision making.
We also recommend that Congress define more precisely how a catastrophic declaration
can be triggered. The PKEMRA definition is vague, leaving a great deal of discretion to
the Administration and leading to pressures for overuse and inconsistencies over time.
There should be one or more triggers or thresholds based on observations, such as fifty
percent damage and an extended evacuation of fifty percent over a broad area. The
difference between a trigger and a threshold is that the former would automatically
produce a declaration whereas the later would simply open the possibility of a
declaration, still allowing considerable discretion. A single trigger or threshold would
apply to all programs while multiple triggers could be program-specific. Designing an
appropriate trigger would be a challenge because no one can foresee the variety of events
that might warrant catastrophic designation. For this reason a threshold might strike a
better balance between the desire for clear rules and the need for judgment.
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Policy Framework
As is true with most policy arenas, the federal government’s approach to disasters has
emerged from a largely disjointed series of decisions. It is only in response to major
events, such as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita that we take time to identify the pieces as
part of a whole and ask how they fit together. While the rest of this report deals with
more specific programs, this section focuses on the broader framework within which they
operate and, as a result, makes broader recommendations.
The relationship among three elements is critical: policy/program, capacity, and task.
Implementation depends on how well the design of the policy/program and the capacity
of the implementing organization(s) fit the task at hand. Katrina/Rita was a catastrophe
that created tasks of response and recovery beyond the capacity of existing organizations.
To enhance performance we have to improve policy/program design and build capacity,
but we also have to recognize that future tasks of response and recovery will be affected
by existing policies. The damage from Katrina was a function of, not only of the size of
the storm, but also policies that encouraged risk taking, discouraged mitigation, and,
thereby, increased exponentially the subsequent task of recovery. In planning for future
recovery we have to consider the interaction of all three elements.
1. Preparation for Catastrophes. The nation was not prepared for a catastrophe like
Katrina/Rita. As noted elsewhere in this report, catastrophes are different from normal
disasters. Not only is the scope much broader, but the needs for response and recovery
are much more urgent. We must design policies and build capacity for catastrophes.
Fortunately, catastrophes are rare and most jurisdictions will never experience one. For
this reason, preparation for a catastrophe is cost-effective only at the federal level.
Recommendations:
1a. The federal government should base its disaster preparation on the likelihood
of a catastrophe.
1b. Preparation should follow the principle of scalable capacity, already enunciated
in the National Response Framework, so that we have capacity for a catastrophe but can
commit lesser amounts in lesser disasters.
2. Risk Recognition. We have paid insufficient attention to multiple types of risk. Our
primary focus has been on terrorism, more specifically the prevention of terrorism, to the
relative neglect of natural disasters and industrial accidents, as Hurricane Katrina and the
BP oil spill illustrate.
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Recommendation:
2a. To the greatest extent possible, emergency management activities should be
promoted under an all-hazards framework that recognizes regional variations in risks and
hazards. This risk profile will include terrorism, but we must understand that the risk of
catastrophic terrorism is variable just as the risk of a catastrophic natural disaster is
variable.
3. Risk Reduction. Risk reduction has not been a cross-cutting policy goal. Many federal
policies designed to promote development goals have also promoted risk taking without
consideration of hazard implications. In order to decrease national exposure to risks we
must insure that risk assessment is included in development decisions.
Recommendations:
3a. Any legislation related to economic stimulus, infrastructure, land use, housing,
commercial development, and similar policies should include an assessment of the nature
and extent of risks created or promoted by the legislation.
3b. Environmental Impact Statements should be required to include discussion of
the relationship between projects, hazard mitigation, and the natural environment.
4. Attention to the Full Disaster Cycle. When the federal government has focused on
natural disasters, the emphasis has been on relief with less attention to the disaster cycle:
preparation, mitigation, response, and recovery. Relief is politically popular, but neglect
of the full cycle is short-sighted.
Recommendation:
4a. The nation should give at least as much attention (not money) to preparedness,
mitigation, and recovery as it does to the provision of disaster relief. Doing so would save
money in the long run by reducing relief and recovery expenditures, thereby helping to
meet the president’s resilience goals.
5. Fragmented Responsibility. Responsibility for and oversight of federal disaster
programs is fragmented and confusing, both in terms of management and congressional
oversight. There are 86 congressional committees with oversight over DHS. There are at
least 107 disaster relief programs under the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance
(CFDA), of which over 50 are listed as "DHS" programs, even though they should
probably be listed under FEMA to comply with the plain intent of the PKEMRA, which
granted greater autonomy to FEMA.

Recommendations:
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5a. Clarify responsibilities and accountability for programs. Streamlined and
comprehensive oversight will improve coordination, while increased FEMA autonomy
will yield better performance in disasters, as recognized by Congress in the PKEMRA.
5b. Mandate that all disaster preparation, response and recovery actions be
integrated across all agencies and governmental levels from the perspective of victims.
6. Emphasis on Cost Containment. A history of the Stafford Act and its
implementation reveals a strong emphasis on cost containment. Such an emphasis is
counter-productive for recovery and for long-term cost reduction, especially following a
catastrophe.
Recommendations:
6a. Balance financial accountability with compassion: State that relief is a moral
imperative as long as governments create or exacerbate risks.
6b. Recognize the cost of delayed recovery in terms of human suffering and
economic loss.
6c. Appreciate the long-term cost saving of adequate funding of robust mitigation
measures following a catastrophe.
7. Learning from Disasters. Congress and the Executive Branch continue to make the
same mistakes after disasters. "Lessons learned" documents are often little more than
lessons "observed," or are congratulatory documents that emphasize what went well
while not applying rigorous analysis to elements where performance can be improved.
Recommendation:
7a. All disasters should be studied by a post-disaster investigation team under
FEMA or DHS. Models of such processes include the Earthquake Engineering Research
Institute’s (EERI) “Learning from Earthquakes” program funded by the NSF under the
National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program (NEHRP), the NTSB‟s investigations of
major aviation and other transport accidents, and NIST’s investigation of the collapse of
the World Trade Center towers on September 11, 2001.
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Notes on Methods
The research design for this report uses multiple methods with both primary and
secondary data. The first part of the design was to review the existing research on
disasters in general and Hurricane Katrina specifically. For example, the research on the
PA program began with a review of relevant testimonies, reports, articles, and books (104
in all) to identify problems as perceived by participants representing three different
perspectives: federal administrators, applicants, and third parties (e.g., academic
researchers). This exercise yielded 236 problem statements, which fell into broad
categories of flaws in program design and procedures, inadequate organizational capacity
and preparation, and the magnitude of Katrina/Rita. The human recovery team analyzed
nearly 175 research articles and reports to develop major areas of inquiry. As part of the
mitigation research, considerable effort was made to identify those planning processes
and the plans that emerged from them (15 different types of documents were reviewed)
that should have included strong mitigation components to determine if the effect of
Katrina was a maturation of mitigation commitment. The locales and levels of
governmental units considered in the mitigation study varied according to topic. For
some, the different responsible state offices’ responses were examined, for others the local
parishes (principally Orleans and Jefferson). Regional analyses were done for the New
Orleans Metropolitan area, the Southeast Louisiana area and for comparative purposes,
the Atchafalaya Watershed. Major themes were identified through the literature for all
subsections. Further, a three-day meeting was held with the advisory team where the
initial themes were further discussed and refined.
In the second phase of this project, each subsection team conducted interviews,
focus groups and participant observations with local leaders in each area. Interviews were
conducted with public officials including those at FEMA and HUD headquarters, those
who represented the federal recovery office and were in the region, those who currently
represent the Louisiana state emergency preparedness office and officials who represent
parish governments within the New Orleans metropolitan areas. Citizens of the storms
were interviewed to determine the challenges they faced as well as leaders of
organizations who advocated for them were also interviewed (nearly forty interviews in
all).
Observations were made of public meetings and committee meetings of recovery
organizations focused on human recovery and mitigation (forty-five in all). In addition,
case studies from Picayune, MS, and Jackson Barracks outside of New Orleans showed
how two relatively well-prepared applicants dealt with the multitude of problems that
beset them.
Analysis of both the secondary and primary data, using pattern matching
techniques, led to the major recommendations in this report. Additionally, key
informants on disasters were also asked to review the initial findings. At the end of this
phase this interim report was written. In a third and final phase, recommendations were
presented to select informants to ensure validity of findings.
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Recommendations for Public Assistance
Robert Montjoy, Monica Farris, and Joel Devalcourt
We must also look at ways to speed up the infusion of eligible public assistance funding to
communities, which can be financially devastated and thus unable to commence critical
infrastructure repair projects without up-front funding.… I firmly believe that we can make
our public assistance program less process-oriented and more outcome-driven. Craig
Fugate (2009, 10)
The need for speed in the delivery of public assistance following a Katrina-like
catastrophe is even greater than after a “normal disaster.” Not only are many people
displaced, but the facilities required to sustain economic and social life are devastated
over a wide area. Delay can be deadly to a region. Yet, assistance must not be haphazard.
To be capable of delivering prompt assistance in an orderly fashion the federal
government should build capacity at all levels, support preparation, promote action, and
improve cost estimation procedures and the PW review and approval process.
1. Build capacity for major disasters. Human resources were simply inadequate to
manage the load after Katrina/Rita: there were too few people with too little training and
experience and too little time on the job before rotations. The results included delays and
inconsistent interpretations of regulations. DHS-OIG attributed most of the problems
following that catastrophe to human resource issues.
Recommendations:
1a: FEMA must fully implement the mandate from PKEMRA for a Strategic Human
Capital Plan (SHCP). Without such a plan it is impossible to evaluate the adequacy of
existing preparations because the goals and assumptions regarding human resource needs
are not explicit.
1b: Congress must provide the necessary support to ensure that FEMA’s human
resource capacity is adequate for catastrophic disasters. The principal support will be in
the form of funding once the plans for staffing and training are completed, but policy
changes may be necessary to assist in the recruitment and maintenance of the Surge
Capacity Force as outlined in GAO-09-59R.
1c: All levels of government should make training and mission readiness assessment
for the PA program truly intergovernmental. PKMERA’s mandate for increased human
resource capacity focuses only on the needs of FEMA. Yet it is difficult to imagine how
FEMA can plan its own human capital without taking into account the capacities at other
levels. Shared training is one means of gaining such knowledge. Further, inclusion of
likely applicants and sub-applicants, as well as contractors, in training will not only
reduce confusion and disagreement after a disaster, but can also improve the training,
itself, by introducing different perspectives and questions. Such a goal implies more than
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allowing selective representatives in classes: it requires proactive programs to encourage
shared training at all levels.
1d: FEMA should investigate the possibility of housing part of its DAE reserve force
in state Emergency Management offices. One PA specialist in each state could
serve several functions, including: 1. being available for call-up as FEMA representatives
on an as-needed in a major disaster (like military reservists or members of the Urban
Search and Rescue Program) and 2. providing training and preparation assessment for
local governments.
1e: FEMA should explore the possibility of creating a national certification program
for private companies that assist in disaster management. It is not cost-effective for
communities to maintain sufficient staff to handle the large numbers of PA applications
necessary after a catastrophe. Disaster management firms can be of great assistance to
communities, but communities must first contract with these firms, about which they
usually know very little, for services with which they not familiar, and in time frames that
provide little opportunity for due diligence. National certification would help
communities to screen firms and would give firms a performance incentive to maintain
certification. Standard contracts would also help communities avoid mistakes and reduce
negotiation time.
2. Support preparation. An important lesson from Katrina is that the recovery phase of
disaster management requires thorough pre-disaster preparation, much as the response
phase does. Most of that preparation must take place at the community level. FEMA
cannot force communities to prepare, but it can encourage and assist them.
Recommendations:
2a: Provide information and technical assistance in community preparation. Lessons
learned from Katrina and other disasters should help communities prepare for disasters.
At a minimum, a report on useful preparatory actions would give communities a checklist
to consider. Examples relevant to the PA program include: pre-disaster documentation,
advance contracting, assessment of potential debris and identification of appropriate
disposal sites, evaluation of ordinances regarding access to private property, adoption of
uniform building codes and standards, and strategic planning that could guide rebuilding
decisions.
2b: Create a program to rate community preparation. Such a program could be
patterned after the Community Rating System (CRS) for the National Flood Insurance
Program.
2c: Incentivize participation in the rating system by grants and/or the commitment
of a higher federal share after a disaster. One option would be the awarding of extra points
for relevant competitive grants programs. Another would be the commitment of a higher
federal share (e.g.an additional 5 percentage points) for the PA program after a disaster.
2d: Conduct studies to assess the requirements, advantages, and disadvantages of
establishing a federal insurance program and requiring participation in it as part of the PA
program. In principle, insurance has many advantages over a grant program. Potential
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beneficiaries help to pay the costs. Differential rates can be used to reward preparation
and mitigation. Insurance contracts can also require periodic assessment of property
values. There are, of course, many problems in making a sound program for disasters, as
the experience of the NFIP demonstrates. It should be possible, however, to design a
program that places the federal government at no greater liability than it has now under
the PA program.
3. Promote action. After Katrina/Rita, FEMA struggled with rules that did not fit
situations and procedures that required multiple levels of approval. The gain in
procedural conformity and possible savings in the prevention of fraud, waste, and abuse
must be weighed against the enormous cost in human suffering and reduced economic
output caused by delayed recovery.
Recommendations:
3a: Design a trigger or threshold for the declaration of a catastrophe. The PKEMRA
definition of a catastrophe is vague, leaving a great deal of discretion to the
Administration and leading to pressures for overuse and inconsistencies over time. There
should be one or more triggers or thresholds based on observations, such as fifty percent
damage and fifty percent evacuation over a broad area. The difference between a trigger
and a threshold is that the former would automatically produce a declaration whereas the
later would simply open the possibility of a declaration, still allowing some, reduced
discretion.
3b: Use forward funding and a forgivable loan program to make federal aid more
readily accessibility. PA is a reimbursement program that requires a non-federal match.
Both features restrict the ability of devastated communities to start projects. A 100
percent federal share upon the declaration of a catastrophe would solve the match
problem, but not the need for advance funding. Further, a 100 percent federal share
removes incentives for applicants to exercise restraint. A loan that can be used as match
and later forgiven under certain conditions allows quick starts for approved projects and
later review as more information becomes available. The Community Disaster Loan
(CDL) program is a promising vehicle, but it would have to be revised to serve this
broader purpose. We suggest the following actions for catastrophes: advance 50 percent
of the cost estimate for approved projects; do not delay grants for insurance settlements
but recover insurance payments after the fact; remove the cap on CDL loans; and allow
the use of CDL funds as non-federal match.
3c: Push decision making down the hierarchy by raising the cap on small projects to
reduce the levels of review. While it may be appropriate to raise the cap for all disasters,
there is certainly justification for a higher cap in catastrophes. The greater scope of
damage means that large numbers of cases can clog the review system. Catastrophic
circumstances should shift the balance between speed of action and prevention of errors
toward the former.
3d: Enable and require the federal government to take responsibility for its decisions
in the PA program. De-obligation of funds can leave states and communities holding the
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bag on projects that have already been started. The Government Accountability Office
(GAO) and the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Inspector General (DHSOIG) noted this problem. It should be accepted that in a crisis, as in battle, there will be
errors, or simply different conclusions about appropriate actions. The remedy should not
be to punish the victims. There should be clear rules about who can make commitments
for FEMA and how they can do so, but commitments once made should not be reversed
except in cases of fraud.
3e: Record and report performance measures based on outcomes and customer
satisfaction. DHS-OIG found that FEMA was tracking only two of the four performance
measures it had adopted, measuring the obligation of funds but leaving out closure rates
and customer satisfaction. Implementation of a new database should solve this problem.
4. Improve cost estimation procedures. Initial estimates are very important because
they are the basis for agreement, or disagreement, on PWs and they set caps for
alternative and improved projects.
Recommendations:
4a: Regularly evaluate cost estimation procedures. FEMA has used an expert panel
to improve cost estimation procedures, but there appears to be no regularly produced
data comparing initial estimates with final costs. There should still be plenty of cases to
use in assessing the accuracy of initial estimates under a variety of conditions. The
argument that a catastrophe significantly affects market conditions could be tested using
data from Katrina/Rita, for example.
4b: Change training and reporting procedures to reduce the use of “0”or
unrealistically low estimates in PWs. After Katrina/Rita there were numerous reports of
PWs being initiated with unrealistically low estimates just to get them started. As a result,
many projects went through multiple versions, as the GAO noted. This practice can lead
to delays as applicants appeal decisions, especially when the estimate sets a cap for future
work, and add to the workload of already overburdened staff at all levels.
4c: Encourage pre-disaster documentation of conditions by publishing examples and
standards. Distinguishing disaster-related damage, which is eligible for assistance, from
pre-disaster condition, which is not, as one of the major challenges that FEMA faced. This
problem could be reduced with better pre-disaster documentation. FEMA could
encourage pre-disaster documentation and reduce post-disaster disagreement by setting
and publishing standards indicating what it would accept.
5. Improve the PW review and approval process. After Katrina/Rita there were
complaints of lost documents, inability to track PWs, inconsistency of decisions,
insufficient information on denials, and lack of an independent appeals process. Much of
the problem can be related to insufficient numbers of trained personnel, a problem we
addressed above. But other changes could help as well.
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Recommendations:
5a: Implement a tracking system for PWs. The EMMIE system that is coming on
line would appear to meet this need.
5b: Require FEMA to give reasons for denials in writing and tell applicants of any
documentation needed. This would seem to be a basic requirement of transparency.
5c: Create an independent appeal process for large projects. The experience with the
appeals process created for Katrina/Rita demonstrated the value of an independent
review.
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Recommendations for Human Recovery
Case Management, Mental Health and the Role of Non-Profits
Pamela Jenkins, Branda Nowell and Michelle Gremillion
Since August 2005, individuals and families in the Gulf Coast area face enormous
challenges to recovery. After a catastrophe, individuals and families have to build back
nearly every facet of their lives. The multi-dimensionality of their recovery involves a
myriad of resources: housing, health care, employment, schools, and day care1. In this
section, we discuss recommendations for the management of the human recovery.
Specifically, we outline recommendations for providing services for ongoing mental
health issues, case management after a catastrophe, and the role of non profits (both
national and international) in recovery. Providing individual assistance is so difficult that
we undertook to explain only part of this recovery, realizing that there are other aspects
that need analysis. We begin with one of the most serious and unaddressed problems of
recovery, the mental health and well-being of individuals and families.

RESOURCES FOR MENTAL HEALTH AFTER A DISASTER
The psychological impacts of disaster include a broad range of symptoms ranging from
simple reactions to serious post traumatic stress disorder. “The longer-term adverse
health effects of the disaster can be expected to be substantial and require follow-up
assessments to determine the need for mental health care services” (Weisler, Barbee, and
Townsend, 2006, p. 586). While much of the literature is based on disasters; the data is
emerging slowly about the long-term effects of the recovery from catastrophe. It is
important to note that in a catastrophe, those supports (for example, family,
neighborhood, and faith based organizations) that would provide informal help are
greatly diminished.

1. Identify resources for mental health in all stages of a catastrophe. The issues in
funding for long term mental health care is problematic, because it is not clear what the
long term effects of recovery are in a community, especially a community with an already
at risk population. For example, The Stafford Act mandates that funding for SAMHSA
mental health treatment only be used for crisis management, not for continuing
treatment. “It has become clear in the wake of Katrina and Rita that the Stafford Act fails
to fully address an event of catastrophic magnitude, inadequately providing for mental
health services for displaced victims” (Boyle, 2007, p. 8).

1

Housing remains central to recovery. While this section of this report does not include specific recommendations
about housing, the need for housing and the issues of rebuilding are intertwined with the all of recovery issues.
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Recommendations:
1a. Amend the Stafford Act to allow states the financial flexibility to allocate funds
for continuing treatment of individuals beyond immediate crisis management after
disasters.
1b. Create emergency provisions in Medicaid that provide flexibility to simplify the
rules and extend Medicaid coverage with federal financing in a crisis situations.

2. Define an effective mental health system. Before Hurricane Katrina, the mental
health system still needed more support. “In Louisiana, the pre-hurricane mental health
infrastructure was overcommitted and inadequate to meet the needs of all those with
serious mental illness. The hurricanes only exacerbated existing problems both by
destroying infrastructure, reducing the mental health workforce and creating a new
population of people in desperate need of mental health services” (Boyle, 2007, p. 7). After
Katrina, the mental health system had to be rebuilt with fewer people and few systems.
Moreover, the reaction to Hurricane Katrina and the recovery created long term stress
that goes beyond the normal stress of a disaster. Vulnerable populations, especially
families with children, faced a myriad of social stressors.
Recommendations:
2a. Create provisions within the Stafford Act for catastrophic disasters that allow for
longer term outpatient treatment of conditions clearly related to the exposure and recovery
issues associated with the catastrophic event.
2b. Changes should include both written procedures and personnel. “Written mental
health response plans may help to ensure knowledge transfer from one event to another
and from one person to another. Plans should include a designated disaster mental health
coordinator with a clear job description, explicit mechanisms to build capacity by
developing collaborative relationships with key agencies, and communication venues”
(Elrod, Hamblen, and Norris, 2006, p. 168). Establish a curriculum that progresses
through the process of a disaster mental health response. It would be helpful to develop
online courses that augment traditional mental health training. During the event, states
should be provided with a list of trainers that are matched to their event and audience.
(Elrod, Hamdlen, and Norris 2006)
3. Link Mental Health Recovery into other Recovery and Social Service Efforts.
Many of the mental health services before Katrina were not coordinated well within the
community. During recovery, mental health services need to be linked into more of the
fabric of the wider social service network. Mental Health providers recognized that the
sheer size and scope of disasters demand collaboration between responding and
supporting agencies.
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Recommendations:
3a. Facilitate network development and referral protocols among mental health
agencies and other social service agencies before the event.
3b: Collaboration must be implemented before the event. Initiating collaborative
relationships during a disaster was too late, too time consuming, and generally nonproductive due to the pressure of each agency trying to follow their own protocols.
3c. Mental health providers need to share data on clients so that patients can be
tracked across agencies to ensure continuity of care, public safety, and to prevent a
disconnection from the other needed post disaster services. A database should be created to
manage this task.

CASE MANAGEMENT
Prior to the response to Hurricane Katrina, very little of the case management was
documented or significantly funded (Phillips, 2009). The following recommendations
highlight the role of the federal government in managing lives after a catastrophe. The
federal response is improving, but case management remains a critical issue for long-term
recovery.

1.

Connect With People Who Need Help. Information about evacuees and their
situation (location, health, housing, transportation) was difficult to obtain. Further, a lack
of coordination among case management providers resulted in some victims not receiving
case management and others receiving services from multiple agencies.
Recommendations:
1a. Essential practices for coordination are defined by collaborating strategies and
policies, procedures, and other methods for communicating and working across multiple
agencies.
1b. The process of requesting and receiving program/client data from federal
partners must be planned for in advance. As some case data now exists (through multiple
sources), it might be possible to maintain those networks built during Katrina. In the
future, data management should have necessary resources. In the chaos of a catastrophic
event, it was very difficult to find evacuees or to know which program they qualified for.
The outreach across the country, but especially in flood-ravaged areas, was not
consistent. Case management agencies stated that they faced challenges in obtaining
timely and accurate information from FEMA. FEMA said requests for information did not
meet their requirements.

2.

Navigating Without a Map. Initial confusion about funding and purpose of case
management programs delayed local case management development. Local agencies had
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difficulty knowing the parameters of the case management system to collaborate on the
process. The confusion about which clients qualified for what program and how to obtain
that information was staggering.
Recommendations:
2a. Best practices for case management and other strategies should be in place and
readily available as a contingency. The federal government could identify case
management agencies in advance and include them in emergency response planning.
2b. FEMA should facilitate the creation of a central clearinghouse for information on
assistance programs and services both locally and federally. The service delivery challenges
may have prevented some from receiving consistent help because of lack of
understanding of multiple agencies’ roles and responsibilities. Service providers lacked a
central repository of information that would help them guide clients through the
confusing array of assistance programs and services available both locally and federally.

3. Getting People the Help They Need through Bureaucratic Constraints. Case
managers faced challenges in meeting client needs due to federal funding rules on direct
assistance. Program eligibility requirements were also a barrier to providing disaster case
management. Some funds were restricted to victims of a specific hurricane. Other
guidelines restricted case management services to residents of FEMA housing only.
Recommendations:
3a. Access to material resources is essential to post-disaster recovery. Case
management programs should have discretionary funds for low-cost unmet recovery
needs and allow local decisions on the use of these funds. Case management agencies saw
the need for direct financial assistance for items such as home repairs, clothing, or
furniture as essential to helping clients, yet such assistance was not always available.
Some programs were not allowed to make direct assistance payments, yet without direct
service funds, short term needs become long-term issues.
3b. Eligibility requirements should continue to be reviewed. This is an ongoing
discussion of who should receive case management and the ability to meet the diverse
needs of the population.
4. Closing the Door before Closing the Deal. The federal government supported
Disaster Case Management, but delays, breaks in funding and time limits hindered
assistance. Throughout the response and recovery, there was variability in application,
implementation and outreach to diverse populations.
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Recommendation:
4a. Consistent ongoing case protocols should be developed and provide adequate
program periods. Some cases were closed not because clients’ needs had been met, but
because the program was ending.

5.

Working in a Context of Overwhelming Need with Limited Capacity.
Numerous sources noted the high staff turnover among case managers. This workforce
problem creates great instability as clients didn’t know the name of their current
manager. Large caseloads were barriers to meeting client needs.
Recommendation:
5a. Best practices for case management and other strategies should be in place
continuously as part of sustainability for human recovery in vulnerable areas. The federal
government could identify case management agencies in advance and include them in
emergency response planning. Effective case management requires service providers with
adequate and stable staffing to create consistency and ensure clients receive adequate
attention. It also requires agencies that have the capacity to serve as a bridge horizontally
as well as vertically, connecting to both state and federal systems as well as with local
level service providers in order to identify and connect people to the help they need.

NON-PROFITS, FOUNDATIONS AND „HELP‟
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were a critical part of New Orleans prior to the
flooding, serving as a source of community and neighborhood strength and employment.
International, national, and local NGO’s were an integral part of the response and
ongoing recovery.

1.

Government Remains Ambivalent about the Integration of NGOs in a
Coordinated Response To Disasters. Broad scale integration of local, national and
international NGOs as part of a coordinated governmental response to catastrophic
disasters requires administrative architecture and capacity that does not currently exist at
the Federal and State levels. While there is a formalized structure in local and national
VOADs, much of the government integration of NGOs in disaster response and long term
recovery of the Gulf region is ad hoc without adequate planning before the storm. This
has exacerbated gaps in coordination and ultimately service provision. Growing
expectations for nonprofits and NGOS’ to assist and even play a leadership role in disaster
response must be balanced against their own shortcomings and complexities.
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Recommendations:
1a. Further clarify the role of NGOs as part of a coordinated governmental response
to catastrophic disasters in the Stafford Act.
1b. Identify roles that appreciate and reflect the inherent strengths and limitations of
NGOs and are accompanied by provisions for integrated planning and capacity building to
ensure these roles can be fully executed. Because catastrophic disasters which overwhelm
the resources and capacity of local, state, and federal government are infrequent, the
capacity for broad scale inclusion of others such as local, national and international NGOs
has not been adequately developed. Relief agencies both national and international
continue to fragment services. NGO roles have not been formalized or integrated into
local and state planning and recovery efforts.

2.

Creating Knowledge About Catastrophes for Non-Profits and Foundations.
Foundations and national non-profits have the ability to draw national and international
attention to the catastrophe, but many of these groups do not have the knowledge about
disasters, especially recovery that will allow them to utilize best practices in their funding
and their services. Recovery from catastrophe has a different trajectory than recovery
from disasters. Rebuilding a community after a catastrophic disaster requires unique
expertise that many NGOs and local government agencies likely lack. A great deal of
funding was designated for immediate relief, but funds for recovery are not so available.
Recommendations:
2a. The tension between responses during normal time periods and in a disaster is
critical. Because vulnerable areas are waiting for the next storm, government programs,
national non-profits and foundations should work with local agencies to provide a set of
programs that bridge the gap between times during a disaster and those more common
time frames without a disaster.
2b. Provide technical assistance in needs assessment and integrated planning to
assist with social, cultural, and structural reconstruction. Create forums for issues of social
justice in the reconstruction process to be addressed.

3.

Giving In a Catastrophe. With so many different types of groups involved in
providing assistance, funders and organizations were often ‘stepping over each other.’
Further, as funders struggled to find ‘whom to fund’, the knowledge that funders relied
on often came from a few sources.
Recommendation:
3a. Identify organizations that are positioned to serve as bridging/coordinating
entities between national and international NGOs, state and local NGOs to aid in linking
local needs to state and national resources. Foundations need to have multiple links on
the ground in vulnerable areas before a major disaster. Too often, the funders found
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themselves “in a hurry” to do something and funding was channeled through their
existing – and often sparse – networks of local NGOs. Because these service delivery
networks had structural holes, assistance was not adequately distributed.

4.

Doing Advocacy in a Catastrophe. Advocacy is a critical element for the
individuals and families to negotiate their recovery. Many of the non-profits and
foundations could not find mechanisms to provide resources for advocacy on behalf of
individuals and families.
Recommendations:
4a. Recognize the importance of advocacy organizations in representing the voices of
vulnerable populations and support their inclusion in relief and recovery planning and
decision making forums.
4b. Identify and support organizations that have existing expertise and legitimacy as
advocates of vulnerable populations. The depth of the need for advocacy was not realized
after Hurricane Katrina; there were many different definitions. Advocacy, however, was
needed for many to receive the most basic of services including housing, food, and health
services.
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Recommendations for Hazard Mitigation
Shirley Laska, Earthea Nance, KC King & Joel Devalcourt
Sadly, catastrophes offer an incredible opportunity for communities to rebuild in a
manner that reduces their vulnerability to similar future events and to put into place
development and building requirements that will continue to guide such building into
the future. This is the case because often so much of the community’s/region’s physical
infrastructure is destroyed in a catastrophe. Not always, but usually, that massive
destruction defines a catastrophe. Opportunities abound to rebuild more safely and to
put into place more stringent building codes and land use plans that will support these
goals and a broad commitment to prevent such events from ever occurring again.
Combine the opportunity with the attention getter it is for the survivors and the society
and you should have a winner for mitigation. Unfortunately, as you have already seen
with the preceding assessment of Public Assistance and Individual Assistance, the
outcome of coastal storm mitigation efforts after hurricanes Katrina/Rita left so much to
be desired. In fact, with all of the problems with PA and IA, Mitigation implementation
may in fact have had the worse failings of the three. Incredible opportunity missed. The
recommendations that follow argue first for a much, much stronger commitment to
hazard mitigation than was in place for these catastrophic storms. The recommendations
also focus on
1. Achieve robust mitigation commitment and implementation. A well-off culture
(that believes it can “absorb” disaster impact) dismisses safety as no one’s responsibility.
States, local communities and individuals can readily avoid doing anything real about risk
and also not succeed when they really want to mitigate. Make it more attractive, feasible,
and required.
Recommendations:
1a. Promote and support non-structural mitigation including storm water
management in a way similar to the growing “green” (resilience) industry that saw so
clearly and took full advantage of the rebuilding opportunities in the Katrina/Rita recovery.
Modernize the thinking and reinforce the multiple benefits approach to capture interest.
“Reinvent” mitigation.
1b. Mitigation should be required and incentivized by making federal mitigation
programs flexible enough to handle the actual local risk profile and to capture local interest
in achieving the risk reduction. Federal requirements and resourcing should make sense to
the locals in terms of local risk reduction involvement, not be impediments for local
“control” of the visioning and goal setting.
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1c. Add a Mitigation Support Function to the Natural Disaster Recovery Framework
in order to take full advantage of the mitigation prospects post a catastrophe and to
promote image of Mitigation which is not an adequately recognized, valued concept like
Emergency Management, despite the current push for disaster resiliency.
2. Refine mitigation requirements to achieve more mitigation. Some mitigation
requirements in place at the time have been found to be impediments to mitigation.
While they were created for important reasons such as control of federal costs, the
unanticipated outcome reduced mitigation in this post catastrophe case.
Recommendations:
2a. Eliminate all local match requirements for mitigation after a catastrophe (HMGP
and PA). When mitigation is possible in as widespread a way as it is after a catastrophe, it is
not the time to be “testing” the locals’ commitment to mitigation through a match or to
save money at the front end. And, with the communities public coffers drained and
without income, the requirement will stymie mitigation. The opportunity for cost saving
in response and recovery to future events is just too great.
2b. In a catastrophe, deem the mitigation of already listed/already approved at-risk
Repetitive Loss properties and approved projects in a community’s Mitigation Plan “cost
effective,” needing no additional calculations. The effort to do the post-catastrophe
required analysis delays and reduces permanently the achievement of mitigation.
3. Resource mitigation effort effectively. Delays and lack of focus on a broad view of
mitigation outcomes rather than the “weeds” of each funding program, both permanently
reduce achievement of mitigation. There is a rhythm of recovery that requires mitigation
to be considered when the rebuilding is occurring and not as an afterthought. It must be
efficiently implemented and with a firm grasp of the desired broad outcomes.
Recommendations:
3a. In catastrophes, mandate federal responsibility for mitigation requiring FEMA to
coordinate with the state to quickly have FEMA work directly with local communities on
disaster-based mitigation programs similar to the commitment that currently exists (and
recommendations to enhance it) to assist communities after a catastrophe in damage
assessment, another key action for risk mitigation. Provide additional support to
communities with compounded economic vulnerabilities and synchronize state and
federal approval.
3b. Reinstate Interagency Hazard Mitigation Team (IHMT) with balanced
membership from federal, state and local or require states and counties/communities to
establish their own for a catastrophe. Have it continue over the duration of the
catastrophe recovery conducting regular assessments of performance of all levels of
government involved, measure achievements and require adjustments to the mitigation
efforts while the recovery is ongoing.
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3c. After trigger of a catastrophe or multiple disaster declarations, require (and
FEMA fund) in such designated counties and large communities a permanent Hazard
Mitigation Office, with strong coordination function, just as an Emergency Management
Office is now required by DHS. Require reporting of mitigation progress. Use these offices
as a pilot for requiring such offices in all counties and large communities nationwide.
This Hazard Mitigation Office is not merely a locus for administering federal mitigation
funds; rather it is the core of conceiving and implementing vulnerability reduction
activities.
3d. Require communities to develop pre-disaster post-disaster redevelopment plans
as mitigation plans are currently required and make it an eligible activity for federal
funding.
4. Fix the recovery burden placed on homeowners who are novices to major home
repair and government red tape. Homeowners received funding to repair/build their
second floor before they received their mitigation funds, i.e. funding for their first floor.
Deaths, mental health breakdowns, loss of family finances and unbelievable pressures of
family separation all occurred while family coordinators of the repair lived in FEMA
trailers, worked fulltime and managed the contracting concurrently as other family
members were scattered in dispersed temporary housing awaiting the repair (and
mitigation) of their homes. With this burden, inexperienced homeowners were asked to
negotiate, and re-negotiate repeatedly an ever-changing maze of procedures and
requirements, in the hopes that some of it would eventually be meaningful and would
produce a recovery outcome with mitigation. A better fictional account of such chaos and
victim harm could not have been written.
Recommendations:
4a. In collaboration with state officials experienced in catastrophes and/or multiple
disasters, FEMA officials develop best practices for creation of a state homeowner recovery
program for a catastrophe. The impacted state, especially if it is a smaller state, is a victim
of the catastrophe and is unable to create a successful massive response post event. The
plan must be created at a template in advance.
4b. Conduct a study to consider using SBA to calculate benefits and distribute
recovery funds (from all federal sources for recovery and mitigation) for homeowners in
catastrophic disasters in lieu of creating new state-level process.
4c. Recognize the incredible trauma of the funding application/repair/rebuilding
process for homeowners in a catastrophe and support them much more adequately to
implement the application process and the repair/rebuilding steps. Nothing can preprepare a homeowner victim for the experience. Fully acknowledge that and deliver in a
usable manner with well-trained professional assistance information about the process
with adaptive management of the information and staff knowledge to fit the situation as
it modifies. This recommendation is not trivial.
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5. Widen mitigation scope of classes of structures. FEMA’s aggressive mitigation
advocacy and implementation is focused heavily on owner-occupied homes while a
community is comprised of a range of structures, all important for its functioning.
Recommendations:
5a. Formulate equally aggressive mitigation advocacy for public buildings,
commercial apartments, commercial buildings, public housing and buildings occupied by
social services such as day care, schools, medical clinics and domestic violence shelters.
5b. Require full enforcement of Executive Order (11988) for 1/500 year protection of
critical structures and work to achieve this requirement for other public/commercial and
commercial housing structures. All federal agencies that can play a role in achieving
comprehensive community structure risk reduction should engage, especially HUD
funding of Public Housing and Section 8.
5c. Revamp Public Assistance implementation to incentivize and guarantee
implementation of mitigation provisions after catastrophes.
6. Realize importance and act on issue of scale of residential structures protected.
As currently implemented HMGP narrowly emphasizes reducing the future risk of the
pre-storm owners of the homes in the flooded area and almost all of the focus is on one
structure at a time.
Recommendations:
6a. In a catastrophe allow all homes which attain a positive benefit/cost ratio in
flooded areas to qualify for federal elevation funding, not just those that continue to be
owned by the pre-storm owners.
6b. To achieve broader scale of risk reduction (not just one owner-occupied house at
a time) FEMA should formalize encouragement of use of combination of eligible HMGP and
CDBG mitigation measures for risk reduction benefits in conjunction with home elevation.
It was begun post-Katrina/Rita but not in the earlier, more timely (greater opportunity)
phase.
7. Significantly improve and support quality risk information and communication.
Scarcity of adequate access to risk data by public and local public officials reduces their
ability to make informed decisions about risk.
Recommendations:
7a. Provide local communities with better information about their local risk profiles
including areas affected by dam and levee failures. The public’s right to know about
environmental risk should extend to free and open access to environmental data and risk
modeling software. There should be transparency about the calculation process for BFEs.
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Conclusions
Across the globe, nation states increasingly face the challenges brought about by
cascading disasters. In the first decade of the 21st century, the United States dealt with the
terrorist acts of 9/11; Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the British Petroleum oil spill, and
numerous floods and wildfires. Response to catastrophes needs to become the norm for
governments’ role rather than the out of the ordinary experience. We cannot emphasize
enough the need to build capacity at a federal level for the worst case scenario. It is not
cost effective for the states to do this on their own, but rather requires concerted
intergovernmental planning. As we illustrated, there are parts of this process in place; but
a need for more systematic planning beginning with the federal government is
imperative.
An integral part of the capacity to respond is to build on the considerable
knowledge amassed from the major disasters of this decade alone. In our project, we
reviewed hundreds of reports and analysis of the response. A critical set of strategies
would be to put together all the knowledge in a single repository. Moreover, these reports
need to be accessible to all types of researchers and practitioners. At the same time, there
is a tremendous amount of institutional knowledge that may be lost. All the relief and
response workers from insurance companies to federal government employees have now
had at least five years experience in the field (some have had a great deal more). These
people have invaluable knowledge that, for the most part, is not captured systematically.
In other words, a system needs to be created transfer knowledge from one disaster to
another.
At the same time, relationships among key actors need to be built prior to a
catastrophe at all levels. What we learned from focus groups and individuals from all
aspects of the catastrophe was the importance of prior knowledge of people in key
positions. These relationships are critical both in the immediate response and especially,
as part of the long-term recovery. Research in this area could focus on how to build
permanent mechanisms to ensure collaboration, especially given the rotation system
which moves staff of all levels into and out of the disaster zone over the long-term
recovery
As important as knowledge and people are to a successful recovery, the
assumptions behind the process are valuable as well. This theme emerged in our own
work, especially in the area of mitigation. From our review, the apparent lack of a timely
commitment to mitigation reduced mitigation outcomes dramatically; precise actions to
accomplish risk reduction should be part of future planning. An actual commitment to
mitigation would translate into proactive ways to deal with risk at all levels. Further, this
commitment to mitigation would be part of a larger effort to focus on outcomes rather
than procedure. From our accounts, the focus on procedure in this catastrophe resulted
in a fractured response, slowing down the recovery.
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Continuing research questions should focus on understanding how to build
capacity by examining the already existing knowledge about catastrophes and linking to
best practice in each area. Responding to catastrophes involves complex sets of actions,
but if there is agreement on goals; then, successful response and recovery are possible.
However, as we have already seen with the BP spill, little has changed within the five
years since these terrible events.
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